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In this exploratory study, we investigated whether and to what extent individual
differences in cognitive and personality variables are associated with spoken idiom
comprehension in context. Language unimpaired participants were enrolled in a
cross-modal lexical decision study in which semantically ambiguous Italian idioms (i.e.,
strings with both a literal and an idiomatic interpretation as, for instance, break the ice),
predictable or unpredictable before the string offset, were embedded in idiom-biasing
contexts. To explore the contributions of different cognitive and personality components,
participants also completed a series of tests respectively assessing general speed,
inhibitory control, short-term and working memory, cognitive flexibility, crystallized and
fluid intelligence, and personality. Stepwise regression analyses revealed that online
idiom comprehension was associated with the participants’ working memory, inhibitory
control and crystallized verbal intelligence, an association modulated by idiom type.
Also personality-related variables (State Anxiety and Openness to Experience) were
associated with idiom comprehension, although in marginally significant ways. These
results contribute to the renewed interest on how individual variability modulates language
comprehension, and for the first time document contributions of individual variability on
lexicalized, high frequency multi-word expressions as idioms adding new knowledge to
the existing evidence on metaphor and sarcasm.
Keywords: idiom comprehension, individual differences, workingmemory, inhibitory control, vocabulary, cognitive
flexibility, personality, predictability
INTRODUCTION
Idioms still represent a challenge to theories of language processing after more than 40 years
from the first psycholinguistic study on idiom comprehension (Bobrow and Bell, 1973). Idioms
belong to the broad class of over-learned sequences of words (multi-word expressions, MWEs, for
overviews see Siyanova-Chanturia, 2013; Cacciari, 2014, among others) whose representations are
stored in semantic memory. In the last decade, idiomatic expressions have gained the attention
of several researchers out of the community of figurative language scholars mostly because what
was initially seen as an oddness—the fact that idioms convey a figurative interpretation (and
some of them a literal meaning as well) not fully determined by a compositional syntactic and
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semantic analysis of their component words—is now considered
an interesting aspect that must be explained by language
processing models. In addition, idioms represent a good test
case for the role of distributional properties of language
in comprehension since idiom composing words are bound
together with a probability much higher than they would
have in freely formed sentences (Vespignani et al., 2010).
Thus, studying the processing mechanisms underlying MWEs
may provide relevant insights about how the brain stores and
processes lexico-semantic knowledge and how semantic storage
and processing interact with the frequency with which words
co-occur in the linguistic environment (Molinaro and Carreiras,
2010; Vespignani et al., 2010).
Several models have been proposed to account for idiom
processing (see below). Notwithstanding, the complex cognitive
architecture that stands behind the relatively easy and fast
comprehension of familiar idioms has not yet been singled out
in full details. Can we take for granted the assumption that
the cognitive architecture underlying language comprehension
is precisely the same no matter whether the input is literal or
idiomatic? The answer is that we do not know yet. There are
reasons to suspect a different involvement and/or weight of
some cognitive components (e.g., working memory or executive
function) when the input is an idiomatic string compared to
when it is a matched literal string. In fact, idioms are somewhat
“special” in that they behave at the same time as partially
compositional string of words (as any other piece of language)
and as non-compositional string of words: while the meaning of
a sentence is obtained by merging individual word meanings as
themessage unfolds, in idiomatic sentences what must bemerged
comprises unitary sequences of co-occurring words (Cacciari and
Corradini, 2015). In addition, when idioms also have a well-
formed literal meaning (e.g., break the ice), the reader/listener
has to decide between competing interpretations favoring the
one contextually relevant and inhibiting already processed and
actually irrelevant information associated to individual word
meanings.
Interestingly, the idiom processing time advantage found with
a variety of behavioral tasks (e.g., Swinney and Cutler, 1979;
Cacciari et al., 2007; Vespignani et al., 2010; Siyanova-Chanturia
et al., 2011; Canal et al., 2017) is accompanied by brain-
imaging evidence suggesting a more complex picture. These
studies consistently reported a stronger and more widespread
activation of the language network for idioms, in particular in
the Inferior Frontal and Middle Temporal Gyri (e.g., Zempleni
et al., 2007; Mashal et al., 2008; Romero Lauro et al., 2008;
Boulenger et al., 2009, 2012) rather inconsistent with the idea
that the comprehension of ready-to-go idiomatic meanings is
relatively undemanding to the processing system1. In sum, idiom
1Prefrontal and frontal regions are involved in the retrieval of the idiomatic
meaning from semantic memory, in response monitoring, and in the inhibition
of an alternative interpretation. Selection and monitoring of internally generated
responses are likely to be performed by the central executive whose neural
correlates predominantly are in the prefrontal lobe (Oliveri et al., 2004; Fogliata
et al., 2007; Rizzo et al., 2007; Romero Lauro et al., 2008; Cacciari and Papagno,
2012).
processing seems to be at the same time fast but more resource-
demanding than the processing of comparable literal sentences.
This increased workload on the language system may reflect the
need to process at least part of the literal meanings of the idiom
constituent words, retrieve the idiomatic meaning from long-
term semantic memory, select between potentially competing
interpretations, and integrate the idiommeaning in context while
suppressing idiom-irrelevant word meanings. Whether these
mechanisms operate sequentially or at least partially in parallel
depends on several factors including the idiom type, familiarity,
predictability before offset and prior contextual information.
Here, we adopted an individual difference perspective
to explore the contributions of components underlying the
cognitive architecture necessary to process idiomatic expressions
in adults, namely general speed, inhibitory control, working
memory, cognitive flexibility, vocabulary knowledge, fluid
intelligence, and personality. Specifically, using a correlational
approach, we explored whether and how individual differences in
these components are associated with the moment-by-moment
context-driven comprehension of spoken idioms. To the best
of our knowledge, the contribution of personality factors to
idiom comprehension in healthy participants has been largely
ignored. Therefore, we used two tests assessing, respectively,
current symptoms of anxiety and propensity to be anxious
(STAI-Y) and components of the personality structure (Big Five
Observer). Measuring state and trait anxiety may reveal whether
or not increased emotional arousal associated to the specific
event (the experiment) or to the individual’s personality may lead
participants to recruit more attentional and processing resources
speeding up mental processing (as documented, in general, by
Svenson and Maule, 1993; Breznitz and Berman, 2003). As to
the Big Five Observer, recently it has been documented an
association of some of the components identified by this test
with creativity and metaphor comprehension (for an overview,
see Batey and Furnham, 2006). It could be interesting to
explore whether associations of this type could generalize to
conventionalized forms of figurative language as idioms.
MODELS OF IDIOM PROCESSING
Decades ago, Bobrow and Bell (1973) proposed that idioms are
semantically empty long words accessed as such from the mental
lexicon (Bobrow and Bell, 1973; Swinney and Cutler, 1979; Gibbs,
1980). Consistently, the Lexical Representation hypothesis (LRH;
Swinney and Cutler, 1979) proposed that idiom meaning is
directly retrieved from semantic memory and not elaborated
via linguistic processing. The computation of the literal and
idiomatic meaning is simultaneously initiated upon occurrence
of the first idiom component word. Since retrieving the idiomatic
meaning takes less time than computing the compositional
meaning of the string, the idiom meaning becomes available
before the literal meaning. In more recent years, evidence against
this “Lexical-look up” approach has accumulated (e.g., Cacciari
and Tabossi, 1988; Titone and Connine, 1994; Peterson et al.,
2001; Tabossi et al., 2005; Sprenger et al., 2006; Cacciari et al.,
2007; Libben and Titone, 2008; Fanari et al., 2010; Vespignani
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et al., 2010; Holsinger and Kaiser, 2013; Canal et al., 2017) leading
to “Non-Lexical Hybrid” models. The Configuration Hypothesis
(CH, Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988; Tabossi and Zardon, 1993;
Vespignani et al., 2010; Cacciari and Corradini, 2015) provided
an influential model of how spoken idiom comprehension
unfolds in time. According to the CH, idioms are incrementally
processed word by word, just like any other linguistic string, until
enough information has accumulated to signal the presence of
an idiom. Only at this point the idiomatic meaning is retrieved
from semantic memory. Hence, the point at which the string is
recognized as a known idiom determines how early the idiomatic
meaning is activated. This recognition point is established in
probabilistic terms as the point after which the probability of a
fragment to be continued idiomatically is extremely high. Idioms
can therefore be predictable or unpredictable before the string
offset depending on how many idiom word constituents must
be processed before the presence of an idiom is recognized or
highly expected (Vespignani et al., 2010). Idiom activation can
be influenced by the information conveyed by previous context
(Peterson et al., 2001; Fanari et al., 2010) since even a minimal
idiom-biasing context can anticipate the idiom recognition point.
In this case, the idiomatic meaning may be already activated at
the end of the idiom string regardless of idiom predictability.
THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
IN FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE PROCESSING
As recently pointed out by Kidd et al. (2018), despite a
long-standing assumption downplaying the role of individual
differences in cognition, it is becoming increasingly clear
that there are important variations among speakers in
language acquisition and processing at any age and across
the lifespan. These may stem from different sources since
language comprehension involves many and diverse perceptual
skills and cognitive processes that interact among them and with
language experience (Farmer et al., 2017). The renewed interest
on how individual differences modulate spoken and written
language comprehension goes beyond what was traditionally
observed in language-impaired populations (e.g., Gernsbacher
and Faust, 1991; Just and Carpenter, 1992; Miyake et al., 1994;
Hannon and Daneman, 2001; Verguts and De Boeck, 2002;
McNamara and McDaniel, 2004; Andrews et al., 2017 among
others; for overviews see Farmer et al., 2012; Andrews, 2015;
Kidd et al., 2018).
Surprisingly enough, this new wave of studies on individual
variability has predominantly concerned literal language
almost ignoring figurative language, despite its pervasiveness.
The few studies on individual differences in figurative
language comprehension have predominantly concerned the
comprehension and/or production of metaphorical sentences
in adults (e.g., Kazmerski et al., 2003; Chiappe and Chiappe,
2007; Pierce et al., 2010) and/or children and adolescents (e.g.,
Nippold and Martin, 1989; Johnson, 1991; Nippold et al., 2001;
Qualls and Harris, 2003; Qualls et al., 2003; Carriedo et al., 2015).
Metaphor comprehension requires a high level of intellectual
ability, processing capacity and inhibitory control (e.g., Kintsch,
2000, 2001; Kazmerski et al., 2003; Carriedo et al., 2015). In fact,
all other things being equal, comprehending a metaphor implies
the abstraction of common features between target and source
domains, the blend of often distant semantic domains, and
the capacity to selectively identify, within the source domain,
what is relevant to the target and suppress irrelevant properties
(e.g., that sharks have fins for “That lawyer is a shark”). This
inhibitory control requires a high WM capacity for maintaining,
momentarily, two interpretations for a same utterance (the
literal and the metaphoric), deciding which aspects of the literal
meaning are metaphor-relevant (e.g., that sharks are voracious),
and updating the ongoing sentential representation (Chiappe
and Chiappe, 2007; Carriedo et al., 2015; Olkoniemi et al., 2016).
Consistently, some studies reported that less-skilled
comprehenders less efficiently suppress interfering and/or
irrelevant information, no matter whether they are adults
(Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991) or children (De Beni et al.,
1998; Cain and Oakhill, 2006). In a study on metaphors with
participants aged from 11 to 21 years, Carriedo et al. (2015) found
that the importance of executive function, a fundamental part of
the cognitive architecture underlying suppression of interfering
information, is evident only in adolescence. Chiappe and
Chiappe (2007) found that WM capacity, inhibitory control, and
vocabulary knowledge contribute to the speed and quality of the
interpretation assigned to metaphorical statements in adults.
Moreover, participants scoring higher in WM measures also
produced more apt metaphors than participants scoring lower.
According to the authors, two types of factors are associated with
the ability to comprehend and produce metaphors: information
processing factors related to the executive mechanisms of WM,
and experiential factors related to crystallized verbal knowledge.
Consistently, Pierce et al. (2010) showed that high WM skills
are associated with more accurate and faster recognition of the
non-literal meaning of metaphorical statements.
In an eye-tracking study, Columbus et al. (2016) tested
whether familiarity and context modulate the comprehension
of metaphorically and literally intended verbs as a function of
individual differences in executive control (the same participants
also performed an idiom comprehension experiment, see below).
Familiarity of metaphorical verbs affected how much time
participants spent reading the verb on first pass regardless of
prior context. Interestingly, readers with high executive control
spent more time fixating the verbs presumably to integrate them
in the unfolding sentential interpretation. In contrast, individuals
with low executive control did not spend a similar extra time but
had longer reading times later on in the metaphor region. This
suggests that executive control skills influence the rapidity with
which semantic commitment to the verb interpretation is made
with effects persisting until the end of the sentence. Another
eye-tracking study (Olkoniemi et al., 2016) examined the role of
individual differences in WM capacity, need for cognition, use of
emotional information, and theory of mind in comprehending
sarcasm, metaphor, and literal sentences. Individual differences
in WM capacity and need for cognition modulated both the
comprehension of metaphoric and sarcastic statements, but
efficiency in using emotional information only played a role for
sarcasm.
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A related line of investigation has tested the roles of fluid
intelligence and creativity in comprehending and producing
metaphors. Silvia and Beaty (2012) found that measures of
fluid intelligence (with tasks mostly testing non-verbal inductive
reasoning) were associated with the capacity to produce
creative metaphors. Participants with high fluid intelligence
produced more creative metaphors than those scoring lower.
In another study, Beaty and Silvia (2013) explored the roles
of fluid and crystallized intelligence, and retrieval capacity in
metaphor production. They observed differential contributions
of cognitive skills depending on the conventionality or creativity
of the metaphors produced. Specifically, fluid intelligence and
retrieval capacity had little association with the production
of conventional metaphors, and medium-size association with
crystallized intelligence. This suggests that the generation of
conventional metaphors primarily recruits prior knowledge
and minimally executive resources, while the production of
creative metaphors involves sophisticated retrieval mechanisms,
as suggested by the observed important contribution of fluid
intelligence.
We now turn to the even fewer studies investigating individual
differences in idiom comprehension. Cacciari et al. (2007)
tested the contribution of individual speed of processing in
comprehending ambiguous idioms, predictable or unpredictable
before offset, using a cross-modal lexical decision paradigm.
Fast and slow participants were equally fast for predictable
idioms. Participants with slower speed of processing also required
more perceptual information before recognizing unpredictable
idioms. In contrast, fast participants responded equally quickly
to targets associated to the two types of idiom. With a response
deadline, all participants activated unpredictable idiommeanings
equally quickly. Presumably, the response deadline speeded up
mental processing and changed the allocation of time and
processing resources (Svenson and Maule, 1993; Breznitz and
Berman, 2003). Reading acceleration in fact extends attention
span, reduces distractibility, helps to overcome some capacity
limitations of short term and working memory, and increases
word retrieval from the mental lexicon (Breznitz and Berman,
2003). In the eye-tracking study described above, Columbus
et al. (2016) did not find any association of executive control
with idiom processing, at variance with neuropsychological
evidence showing the centrality of executive function to idiom
comprehension.
RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
The main goal of this study was to explore the different
contributions of cognitive and personality components to
moment-by-moment spoken idiom comprehension when
supported by contextual information. To assess idiomatic
meaning activation we used a paradigm, the cross-modal lexical
decision task, that has been fruitfully used in many previous
studies on idiom comprehension in and out of context (e.g.,
Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988; Titone and Connine, 1994; Tabossi
et al., 2005; Cacciari et al., 2007; Fanari et al., 2010). In this
paradigm, participants listen to a sentence and judge whether a
visually presented target word is or is not a word. In this study,
the prime is an idiom-biasing sentence ending with an idiom
and the target word either a word semantically associated with
the idiomatic meaning or an unrelated, control word (see the
Method section for the target selection procedure). Semantic
priming occurs whenever there is more efficient processing of
the target word when preceded by a related context, in this
case the idiom-biasing sentence, which means faster decision
times for the idiomatic than for the control target. In this study,
we analyzed whether measures of general speed, inhibitory
control, short-term and working memory, cognitive flexibility,
crystallized and fluid intelligence, and personality are associated
with and predicted the cross-modal lexical decision times
to predictable and unpredictable ambiguous idioms. Since
ambiguous idioms possess both a literal and an idiomatic
interpretation, the idioms tested in this study were preceded
by idiom-biasing contexts that clarified which one of the two
interpretations was contextually appropriate. In line with the CH,
we assume that any cues to a non-literal sentential interpretation
are likely to anticipate the point at which a fragment can bring
to mind an idiom, triggering idiom meaning activation. In
fact, as previous studies have shown (e.g., Peterson et al., 2001;
Cacciari et al., 2007; Fanari et al., 2010), even a short context
preceding an idiom can bias toward the idiomatic interpretation.
Given that the idiom strings of this study were embedded in
idiom-biasing contexts, we expect participants to activate the
idiomatic meaning of both predictable and unpredictable idioms.
Nonetheless, the activation of unpredictable idioms may require
longer response times than for predictable idioms (Cacciari and
Corradini, 2015). In fact, the notion of predictability captures
the fact that, upon hearing part of a string, participants may
recognize it as belonging to a known idiom. Although idiom-
biasing contexts speed up idiom recognition, identifying an
unpredictable idiom (whose recognition point out of context
is after the idiom string offset) may require the processing of
more input than identifying a predictable idioms. Differently,
listening to a smaller part of the string may suffice to actively
pre-activate the idiomatic meaning of predictable idioms. In
this study, responding to idiomatic targets of predictable idioms
should be the easiest and fastest (given the joint effects of idiom
familiarity, contextual bias, and predictability), followed by the
idiomatic targets of unpredictable idioms, then by the control
targets of predictable and unpredictable idioms that are both
idiom-unrelated and not primed by idiom-biasing contexts.
EXPERIMENT AND TESTING
Method
Participants
Sixty-four students volunteered to participate in the study (23
male and 41 female; mean age = 21.9 years, SD = 3.4). All
were Italian native speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, unaware of the aim of the study. This study was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of the “Italian
Association of Psychology” (AIP) Ethical Guidelines (Codice
Etico: www.aipass.org/node/11560) and with the standard
procedures of the University of Modena-Reggio Emilia. All
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subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
Norming phase for the cross-modal lexical decision
experiment
Idiom familiarity and knowledge of the idiomatic meaning. Eighty
idioms with both an idiomatic and a literal interpretation
(ambiguous idioms) were selected from a list of Italian idioms.
Twenty-five university students were asked to rate the familiarity
of each idiom on a seven-point scale (from 1: never heard to 7:
heard very often) reported under each idiom. At the end of the
questionnaire, they went back to the beginning and paraphrase
each idiom. Since the task was rather demanding in time, the
idioms were split into two questionnaires. We selected 48 idioms
highly familiar (M = 5.75, SD= 0.54) and correctly paraphrased
by 95% of the participants.
Age of Acquisition (AoA). Since the AoA of idioms correlates
with idiom familiarity and knowledge of the idiomatic meaning
(Tabossi et al., 2011; Bonin et al., 2013), and is a reliable predictor
of paraphrase verification times (Bonin et al., 2013), we selected
predictable(P) and unpredictable (UP) idioms with similar AoAs.
The AoA was evaluated using a questionnaire listing the 48
idioms with a 7-point rating scale under each idiom (1: 0–2
years, 2: 3–4 years, 3: 5–6 years, 4: 7–8 years, 5: 9–10 years, 6:
11–12 years, 7: more than 13 years). Twenty-five students were
asked to estimate the age at which they had learned each idiom.
Participants reported that they learned the idioms, on average,
between 10 and 11 years (M = 5.28; SD = 1.2), in line with what
has been shown in the idiom acquisition literature (Levorato and
Cacciari, 1999).
Idiom recognition point. In order to assess the point at which the
idiomatic nature of each string was identified, a questionnaire
was prepared with 48 minimal contexts containing the idioms
without the last constituent (e.g., the boy broke the . . . ) and
48 filler fragments of similar length and structure. Twenty-
five students were asked to complete each sentence with
the first word that came to mind. The idioms that were
completed idiomatically with a cloze probability of at least
70% were considered as predictable (P idioms) and those
that received <30% of idiomatic completions as unpredictable
(UP idioms). To ensure that the completions were not due
to literal interpretations, each participant was also asked to
provide a meaning paraphrase of each sentence. Participants
always provided idiomatic paraphrases. Twenty-eight idioms
were selected, 14 predictable and 14 unpredictable, balanced for
familiarity and AoA (see Tables 1–3).
Meaning dominance. To test whether the dominant meaning
of the idiom strings was literal or figurative, 25 participants
were asked to rate the extent to which each idiom string was
heard/used in a literal or figurative sense (1: mostly literally
to 5: mostly figuratively). The figurative meaning was similarly
perceived as the dominant one in P and UP idioms.
Target selection. To select the idiomatic visual targets, 15
participants were asked to provide a word semantically associated
to the idiomatic meaning of the string. The words more
frequently associated to each idiom were listed under the idiom
string in a written questionnaire. Fifteen students were asked
to rate on a 5-point scale the extent to which each word was
associated to the figurative meaning of the idiom string (from
1 indicating not at all associated, to 5 strongly associated). The
TABLE 1 | Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), and statistics of the norming of the psycholinguistic variables of predictable and unpredictable idioms.
Predictable idioms Unpredictable idioms Statistics
Idiom recognition 84.7% (8.31%) 10.7% (8.45%) t(26) = 10.055, p = 0.0001
Familiarity 6.02 (0.57) 5.86 (0.67) t(26) = 0.695, p = 0.493
AoA 4.96 (0.47) 5.09 (0.69) t(26) = 0.567, p = 0.575
Meaning dominance 3.73 (0.53) 3.69 (0.50) t(26) = 0.178, p = 0.86
Idiomatic target association 4.13 (0.46) 4.0 (0.64) t(26) = 0.608, p = 0.548
Idiomatic target length 9.07 (2.2) 8.07 (2.33) t(26) = 0.413, p = 0.663
Idiomatic target syllables 3.79 (1.12) 3.5 (0.76) t(26) = 0.789, p = 0.473
Idiomatic target AoA 3.89 (0.84) 3.5 (0.72) t(26) = 1.137, p = 0.266
Idiomatic target written frequency (fpmw)* 46.94 (62.7) 28.83 (48.21) t(26) = 0.857, p = 0.399
Idiomatic target familiarity 4.88 (0.53) 4.73 (0.57) t(26) = 0.685, p = 0.499
Control target length 8.57 (2.03) 8.21 (2.58) t(26) = 0.408, p = 0.687
Control target syllables 3.64 (0.93) 3.5 (1.09) t(26) = 0.274, p = 0.712
Control target AoA 3.77 (1.07) 4.12 (1.05) t(26) = 0.869, p = 0.393
Control target written frequency (fpmw)* 60.76 (62.6) 26.96 (24.45) t(26) = 1.93, p = 0.07
Control target familiarity 4.94 (0.75) 4.46 (1.15) t(26) = 1.297, p = 0.206
Lex. Dec. Times Idiomatic target 731ms (80) 777ms (94) t(26) = 1.388, p = 0.177
Lex. Dec. Times Control target 726ms (54) 776ms (88) t(26) = 1.769, p = 0.089
Number of words of Contexts 14.57 (0.94) 15.21 (1.05) t(26) = 1.708, p = 0.10
*Written frequency was calculated on ITAWaC (Baroni et al., 2009) and expressed as frequency per million of words (fpmw).
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TABLE 2 | Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), and statistics of the norming of the psycholinguistic variables of Idiomatic and Control targets.
Idiomatic targets Control targets Statistics
Number of characters 8.89 (2.25) 8.39 (2.28) t(54) = 0.825, p = 0.413
Number of syllables 3.64 (0.95) 3.57 (1.0) t(54) = 0.274, p = 0.785
AoA 3.72 (0.78) 3.95 (1.06) t(54) = 0.917, p = 0.363
Written frequency (fpmw)* 30.88 (55.64) 43.85 (48.6) t(54) = 0.428, p = 0.67
Familiarity 4.81 (0.55) 4.7 (0.99) t(54) = 0.485, p = 0.629
*Written frequency was calculated on ITAWaC (Baroni et al., 2009) and expressed as frequency per million of words (fpmw).
words with the highest association rating were used as visual
targets. The mean association ratings for the targets of P and
UP idioms were similar. To control that the selected targets
were not associated with the last word of the string, 10 students
were presented with the last word of each string and were asked
to produce the first associated word that came to mind. None
of the experimental targets was generated. The targets for P
and UP idioms were balanced for number of characters and
syllables, AoA, written frequency, and familiarity (see Table 3 for
examples, and the Appendix for the idioms and targets list).
All control targets had an abstract meaning as the idiomatic
targets, were not produced in the selection of idiomatic targets
nor were they associated to idioms. Idiomatic and control targets
were balanced for number of characters and syllables, AoA,
written frequency, and familiarity. The control words associated
to P and UP idioms were balanced for number of characters and
syllables, familiarity, AoA, and written frequency.
A control experiment was run to determine whether the
lexical decision times for the targets of P and UP idioms were
comparable when presented in isolation. The 28 target words
were included in a list of 112 items (56 words, i.e., 28 idiomatic
and 28 control targets, and 56 legal non-words). The filler words
were all abstract. Each stimulus was visually presented in a
randomized order to 15 participants who performed a visual
lexical decision task. Lexical decision times were statistically
similar for idiomatic and control targets; for idiomatic targets
associated to P and UP; and for controls associated to P and UP
idioms.
Sentential contexts. The 28 idiom strings were inserted in
contexts orienting the interpretation toward the figurative sense
of the string. The average number of words composing them was
14.89 (SD = 1.03). The idiomatic contexts associated to P and
UP idioms had a similar number of words.
In addition to the 28 experimental sentences, 84 filler
sentences of the same length (M = 14.94, SD= 1.22) and similar
syntactic structures, but without any figurative expressions, were
created. A visual target was paired to each filler sentence: 56
targets were legal non-words and 28 were words, so that we had
an equal number of words and non-words within each list. The
filler target words had on average the same number of syllables
of the experimental words. Fourteen of the filler words were
semantically associated to the sentence in order to avoid that
participants developed a response set to the experimental trials.
All filler words had an abstract meaning.
Two lists were created so that each idiom was presented
only once, either associated to the idiomatic target or with the
control target. Participants were randomly associated to one
of the two lists. Each list contained 112 sentences in a quasi-
randomized order: 28 experimental sentences (14 idiomatic
sentences followed by idiomatic targets, 14 idiomatic sentences
followed by control targets) and, interspersed among the
experimental sentences, the 84 filler sentences. The experiment
was preceded by a practice session formed by 10 different literal
sentences, followed by a word in half of the cases and by a legal
non-word in the other half, that were not further analyzed.
The stimuli were presented on an IBM-compatible personal
computer using DMDX software (Forster and Forster, 2003). A
male speaker digitally recorded the sentences. A cue, inaudible
to the participants, was placed in the sound files to specify the
position of the target and caused the program to display it on the
screen. In all the sentences the target appeared at the offset of the
sentence-final word.
A recognition test on the sentences heard during the
experiment was prepared to verify that participants had actually
paid attention to the sentences. The test was administered
immediately after the experimental session and was composed
by 28 sentences printed on separate cards. Fourteen of these
sentences had appeared in the experiment as filler sentences and
14 had not, but were similar in length and structure to the filler
sentences. Participants were given the 28 cards and were asked to
pick out those presented during the experiment. A threshold of
75% of correct recognitions was set for inclusion of a participant’s
data in the statistical analyses.
Testing of individual differences
The cognitive and personality components tested in this study
were assessed with the following tasks:
General speed: Simple Reaction Time task. Participants were
asked to press as fast and accurately as possible a specific
response button (CTRL left or right depending on the dominant
hand) each time a star appeared on the screen. The randomly
distributed inter-trail intervals were 600, 900, 1,200, and
1,500ms. There was a practice session of 10 trials followed by 80
experimental trials. We recorded the response times between the
onset of the stimulus and the response. Response times exceeding
1,500ms were considered as errors.
Inhibitory control: (1) Go-No Go task. Participants were asked
to press the space bar as fast and accurately as possible when a
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TABLE 3 | Examples of experimental materials in Italian and with word-by-word
English translations (in parentheses).
PREDICTABLE IDIOMS
Il cliente ha ascoltato l’offerta del venditore e ha deciso di prenderla al volo. (The
customer listened to the seller’s offer and decided to take it on the fly).
Idiomatic target: OCCASIONE (CHANCE)
Control target: DESTINO (DESTINY)
Quando Luisa si è accorta che aveva perso l’antico anello si è strappata i capelli.
(When Luisa realized that she had lost the old ring, she torned her hair).
Idiomatic target: DISPERAZIONE (DESPAIR)
Control target: RELAZIONE (RELATIONSHIP)
UNPREDICTABLE IDIOMS
Lucia ha fatto il concorso nella sua università perché sapeva di giocare in casa.
(Lucia did the competition at her university because she knew she was playing at
home).
Idiomatic target: VANTAGGIO (ADVANTAGE)
Control target: SVOLTA (TURN)
Sara stava raccontano una favola alla nipotina ma si accorse di aver perso il filo.
(Sara was telling a story to her granddaughter but realized she had lost the
thread).
Idiomatic target: DISTRAZIONE (DISTRACTION)
Control target: NAZIONE (NATION)
triangle (Go stimulus) appeared on the screen and refrain from
responding when a circle appeared (No-Go stimulus). There were
200 trials, of which 160 were Go trials and 40 No-Go trials, with
randomly distributed inter-trial intervals of 600, 900, 1,200, and
1,500ms.We recorded the response times to GO trails, omissions
(i.e., no response to GO trials) and intrusions (incorrect response
to NO-GO trials); (2) Stroop task. Participants were presented
with letter strings for which they had to name the color. Each
letter string could belong to either one of three conditions:
congruent (e.g., VERDE, written in a matching hue, green),
incongruent (e.g., VERDE written in a mismatching hue, red), or
neutral. This condition was represented by the letter string XXXX
written in red, blue or green. Congruent and incongruent color
words were VERDE, BLU, and ROSSO. There were 96 trials, with
24 congruent trials, 24 incongruent trails, and 48 neutral trials (16
for each color). We recorded the latency between presentation of
the item and onset of the participant’s response. The inter-trial
interval was 2,000ms. Prior to the experimental trials, there were
12 trails of practice in which participants named the color white
in which VERDE, BLU, or ROSSO were written on the screen.
For each participant, we computed a facilitation effect (the mean
RT to congruent trails minus the mean RT to neutral trials),
an inhibition effect (neutral RT minus incongruent RT), and a
maximal inhibition effect (incongruent RTminus congruent RT),
(3) Intrusions errors in the Listening Span test (see below). They
provide an estimate of inhibitory control since participants are
required to use it to reduce the accessibility of non-final words,
prevent their recall and therefore produce fewer intrusions (De
Beni and Palladino, 2000).
Short-Term and Working Memory: (1) Forward Digit Span
Test and Backward Digit Span Test (from the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale Revised, Wechsler, 1981; Italian Version:
Laicardi and Orsini, 1998). These tests assess the serial recall of
digit strings. The scores are based on the higher number of digits
recalled in the correct forward and backward orders. Each test
starts with a string composed by three digits and continues by
adding one digit until the participant fails to recall the string
twice; (2) Backward counting: Participants were asked to count
backward from 100 to 1 as fast and accurately as possible. We
recorded the total latency; (3) Listening Span (Daneman and
Carpenter, 1980; Italian Version: Pazzaglia et al., 2000). This
test requires the memorization of the last item of each sentence
(auditorily presented) within sequences of sentences (composed
by between 6 and 12 words) with 20 sequences including 2, 3, 4,
5, and 6 simple sentences (four sequences in each case). Half of
the sentences are “true” and half “false.” Participants were asked
to listen to each sentence and answer whether it was “true” or
“false.” At the end of the sequence, participants were asked to
recall the last word of each sentence.We considered three indices:
the listening span, that is the highest level at which all the final
words were recalled in the correct order; the number of recalled
words, that is the total number of items correctly recalled in the
correct order; and the number of intrusions, that is the number of
non-final words that were incorrectly recalled but that belonged
to the set of presented sentences. It has been proposed (for
overviews, see Farmer et al., 2012, 2017) that reading/listening
span tests provide measures of language processing
skills driven by linguistic experience rather than only of
verbal WM.
Cognitive Flexibility and Crystallized Verbal Intelligence: (1)
Phonemic and Semantic Fluency Tests (Italian Version: Novelli
et al., 1986). In the Phonemic fluency test, participants were
asked to produce as many words beginning with given letters
(in Italian, F, P, L) as possible in a time interval (60′′ for each
letter). In the Semantic fluency test, individuals produce as many
members of given stimulus categories (car brands, fruits, and
animals) as possible in a time interval (60′′ for each category).
The final scores of Semantic and Phonetic fluency are obtained
by summing up the number of items produced within the time
interval for each letter or category. According to Troyer et al.
(1997), the fluency performance is based on two distinct cognitive
operations: Clustering (i.e., the production of words within
semantic and phonetic categories) and switching (i.e., the ability
to shift between clusters) both assessing cognitive flexibility.
This test is considered to provide an estimate of executive
function (Troyer et al., 1997; Lezak et al., 2004); (2) Vocabulary
knowledge: Vocabulary subtest of theWAIS-R. Participants were
asked to define the meaning of 40 items. Correct definitions
were assigned 2 points, partially correct 1 point, and no response
and incorrect definitions 0 points. The Vocabulary subtest is
thought to estimate the global verbal intelligence function related
to already acquired knowledge (namely, crystallized intelligence;
Lezak et al., 2004). This test also provides a possible estimate of
lexical access skill in adults (Kidd et al., 2018).
Fluid Intelligence: Raven Progressive Matrices (RPM, Raven,
1960). RPM is a non-verbal test that provides an estimate
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of non-verbal fluid intelligence by testing spatial, abstract
reasoning. Participants were presented with a booklet
comprising four series of visual geometric forms (of 12
items each, of increasing complexity) with a missing piece,
and were given six to eight choices to pick from and fill
in the missing piece (within a total time limit of 30min).
The performance is measured in terms of total number
of responses and number of correct responses for the
matrices.
Personality: (1) Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-
Y, Spielberger et al., 1970). It is used to measure, via self-report,
the presence and severity of current symptoms of anxiety and
a generalized propensity to be anxious. The first subscale, the
State Anxiety Scale (formed by 20 items), evaluates the current
state of anxiety, asking how respondents feel “right now,” using
items that measure subjective feelings of apprehension, tension,
nervousness, worry, and activation/arousal. The second subscale,
the Trait Anxiety Scale (formed by 20 items), measures relatively
stable aspects of anxiety proneness, including general states
of calmness, confidence, and security. Each item of the two
subscales is rated on a 4-point scale. Higher scores indicate
greater anxiety; (2) Big Five Observer (BFO, Italian Version:
Caprara et al., 1993). This personality test is inspired by the
BIG FIVE model of personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) that
has identified five dimensions of personality: 1. Extroversion
(i.e., interest in people and events, ability to enjoy, assertiveness,
activeness, a desire to communicate, and emotional feelings);
2. Agreeableness (compassion, niceness, gentleness, confidence
in others, trust, and warmth); 3. Conscientiousness (high level
of organization and perseverance during task-oriented activities,
diligence, responsibility, and achievement); 4. Neuroticism (lack
of stability, worry, fear, depression, and mood changes); 5.
Openness to Experience (creativity, imagination, rapid grasp,
curiosity). The test is composed by 40 pairs of opposite adjectives
(eight for each of the dimensions). Participants were asked for a
self-evaluation on each adjective pair using a seven-point Likert
scale.
PROCEDURE
In the cross-modal lexical decision experiment, participants were
tested individually in a sound-attenuated room. They sat at
a distance of ∼65 cm from the computer screen. The target
word appeared in the center of the screen written in black
characters (GENEVA 18) on a white background and remained
on the screen until participant response. If no response was
provided in 4,000ms, the target disappeared and the next trial
appeared. The participant response was followed by an interval of
900ms before the subsequent sentence began. The experimental
instructions were displayed on the screen and then repeated by
the experimenter before the training session. Participants were
informed that a letter string would appear at the end of each
sentence. They had to decide whether it corresponded or not
to an Italian word and press an appropriately labeled response
key (CTRL key on the right = word and CTRL key on the
left = non-word for right-handed participants, the opposite
for left-handed ones). After 10 training trials, the experiment
began. Participants were instructed to pay attention to the
sentences because they would be asked some questions at the
end of the session. Immediately after the experiment, participants
performed the recognition test. The experiment lasted on average
25min.
Testing and cross-modal lexical decision experiment were
individually performed in two different sessions taking place
a week after the other. The order of testing and experiment
was quasi-randomized across participants. In one session,
participants performed the following tests in this order: Listening
Span test, Simple reaction times, Go-No Go task, Digit Span,
Semantic and Phonetic fluency, Vocabulary; in another session,
they carried out the cross-modal lexical decision experiment, the
Stroop test, RPM, STAI-Y, and BFO.
DATA ANALYSIS
We conducted analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on the average
reaction times of correct responses for condition to the
cross-modal lexical decision experiment considering both
participants and items as random factors. In the by-participant
analysis (indicated by subscript 1), Idiom type (Predictable vs.
Unpredictable) and Target (Idiomatic vs. Control) were within-
subject factors. In the by-item analysis (indicated by subscript 2),
Idiom Type was a between-subject factor and Target a within-
subject factor.
To explore whether individual difference in the cognitive and
personality components were associated with the comprehension
of idioms, we computed: (1) Pearson correlations between
the participants scores in each test and their correct average
response times to idiomatic and control targets in predictable
and unpredictable idioms; to idiomatic and control targets
regardless of idiom type; and to predictable and unpredictable
idioms regardless of target type (see Table 4). We only report
and comment significant bivariate correlations; (2) hierarchical
regressions on the average response times to correct answers
using blockwise entry. Six predictor variables (i.e., those
that led to statistically significant correlations with response
times, see Table 4), divided in three blocks, were entered in
the following order: Block 1, formed by variables assessing
the personality component (Openness to Experience and
Agreeableness of the BFO, and State Anxiety); Block 2, formed
by measures of WM and inhibitory control (recalled words and
intrusions of the Listening Span); and Block 3, formed by a
variable testing crystallized verbal intelligence (Vocabulary) (see
Table 5).
Given the large number of tests, the alpha inflation was
controlled by setting the False Discovery Rate to 0.05. The
FDR was estimated through the procedure described in Storey
and Tibshirani (2003). The bootstrap procedure was used to
estimate the pi0 parameter (Storey et al., 2004; for a general
view on the bootstrap procedure see for instance Efron and
Tibshirani, 1993; Di Nocera and Ferlazzo, 2000). In our
analyses, the 0.05 levels of significance corresponded to an
FDR < 0.05.
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RESULTS
Cross-Modal Lexical Decision Times
Experiment
All participants met the threshold in the recognition test (mean
correct recognition = 79%). In order to reduce variability, data
points ±2 SDs from the mean response time of each participant
were excluded from the analyses (1.3%). Errors represented only
the 1.07% (SD = 0.58) of the total responses, therefore they
were not statistically analyzed (see Figure 1 for the mean lexical
decision times for idiomatic and control targets of predictable
and unpredictable idioms).
The Target factor was significant [F1(1, 63) = 42.844, MSE
402590.25, ηp
2
= 0.405, p = 0.000; F2(1, 26) = 8.582, MSE
107976.446, ηp
2
= 0.248, p = 0.007; MinF′ (1, 37) = 7.336,
p = 0.01] with faster lexical decision times for idiomatic than
for control targets (95% CI: 65± ms). Unfortunately, both the
Idiom type factor and the Idiom Type X Target interaction were
significant in the by-participant but not in the by-item analysis
[F1(1, 63) = 35.918, MSE 250357.141, ηp
2
= 0.363, p = 0.0001;
F2(1, 26)= 2.212, MSE 20176.782, ηp
2
= 0.078, p= 0.149; MinF′
(1, 29) = 2.084, p = 0.16; F1(1, 63) = 3.877, MSE 32942.25,
ηp
2
= 0.058, p = 0.053; F2(1, 26) = 0.191, MSE 2405.161,
ηp
2
= 0.007, p = 0.666; MinF′ (1, 29) = 0.182, p = 0.673,
respectively]. The relatively low number of stimuli per condition
is presumably responsible for the lack of by-item significant
effects in both cases.
Bonferroni-corrected t-tests showed that control targets were
responded to significantly slower than idiomatic targets in both
predictable and unpredictable idioms [t(63) = 3.566, SEM 15.88,
d = 0.50, p = 0.001; by an average of 57ms; 95% CI: ±31.5ms;
t(63) = 5.822, SEM 17.52, d = 0.83, p = 0.0001; by an average
of 102ms; 95% CI: ±35ms, respectively]. Idiomatic and control
targets were both responded to faster in predictable than in
unpredictable idioms [t(63) = 2.64, SEM 15.1, d = 0.36, p= 0.01;
by an average of 40ms; 95% CI: ±30ms; t(63) = 5.334, SEM 16,
d = 0.69, p = 0.0001, by an average of 85ms; 95% CI: ±32ms,
respectively].
In sum, we found contextually-driven activation of the
idiomaticmeaning for both predictable and unpredictable idioms
in line with our prediction and with previous studies (e.g.,
Cacciari et al., 2007).
Following the suggestion of one the reviewers, we also used
linear mixed models with random intercepts to investigate the
effects of the Idiom type and Target factors, and their interaction.
Idiom type, Target, and Idiom type by Target interaction were
included as fixed effects in the model, whereas Item and Subject
were included as random effects in the model. Before running
the analyses, the small number of missing RTs were estimated
through multiple imputations (R package “mice,” Buuren and
Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). Results replicated those showed
above. Namely, removing the Target factor from the full model
yielded a significant effect [χ2
(2)
= 42.89, p < 0.001], whereas
removing the Idiom factor or the Idiom by Target interaction
did not yield any significant effect [χ2
(2)
= 4.32, p = 0.12, and
χ2
(1)
= 1.69, p = 0.19, respectively]. As the study was originally
designed to be analyzed using the conventional by-participant
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TABLE 5 | Descriptive statistics for the individual difference measures entered in
the stepwise regression analysis.
Variable Observed range Mean Standard deviation
BLOCK 1
Openness to experience 14–35 24.64 5.04
Agreeableness 10–40 21.82 6.52
State anxiety 21–63 34.0 7.77
BLOCK 2
LS: correctly recalled words 8–30 22.09 4.81
LS: Intrusion errors 0–6 1.98 1.62
BLOCK 3
Vocabulary 28–58 42.03 7.48
and by-item ANOVA, we prefer to retain and discuss those
results.
Correlational Analyses
All the variables included in the correlational analyses were
normally distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test > 0.10 in all
cases). We only report the variables that led to statistically
significant correlations with the measures of idiom processing
(Table 4). For sake of clarity, we present each component
separately.
WM and Inhibitory Control
Significant correlations only concerned the Listening Span test.
Specifically, the number of recalled words inversely correlates
with the response times to idiomatic and control targets of
predictable (r = −0.288, p = 0.021, r = −0.343, p = 0.005,
respectively) and unpredictable idioms (r = −0.359, p = 0.004;
r = −0.295, p = 0.018, respectively). In sum, the faster
participants were in correctly responding to idioms, the higher
was their verbal WM. The number of intrusions is positively
correlated with the response times to idiomatic targets of
predictable idioms (r = 0.280, p = 0.025) in that the faster
participants were in responding to idiomatic targets, the lesser
intrusion errors they made.
Vocabulary
Vocabulary scores inversely correlate with the response times to
idiomatic targets of predictable idioms (−0.311, p = 0.012), to
predictable and unpredictable idioms (r = −0.272, p = 0.029;
r = −0.269, p = 0.031, respectively), regardless of target type,
and with the response times to idiomatic and control targets,
regardless of idiom type (r = −0.276, p = 0.027; r = −0.263,
p = 0.036, respectively). In sum, the better the participants
performance was in the Vocabulary test, the faster participants
were in responding to idioms.
Personality
State Anxiety scores inversely correlate with the response times
to both idiomatic and control targets of unpredictable idioms
(r = −0.294, p = 0.019; r = −0.254, p = 0.043, respectively),
with the response times to unpredictable idioms, regardless of
target type (r = −0.283, p = 0.024), and with the response
FIGURE 1 | Means of the correct responses for idiomatic and control targets
of predictable (P) and unpredictable idioms (UP idioms). Bars refer to standard
error.
times to idiomatic and control targets, regardless of idiom type
(r = −0.271, p = 0.030; r = −0.243, p = 0.053, respectively).
In sum, higher levels of temporary anxiety due to a specific
event (presumably the experiment) were associated to faster
response times to these targets. Trait Anxiety scores inversely
correlate only with the response times to the control targets
of unpredictable idioms (r = −0.255, p = 0.045). Extraversion
scores of the BFO inversely correlate with the response times to
control targets of unpredictable idioms (r = −0.272, p= 0.032).
Both Agreeableness and Openness to Experience scores inversely
correlate with the response times to idiomatic and control
targets of unpredictable idioms (Agreeableness: r = −0.276,
p = 0.03; r = −0.274, p = 0.031, respectively; Openness to
Experience: r = −0.323, p = 0.01; r = −0.255, p = 0.046,
respectively), with the response times to unpredictable idioms,
no matter the target type (Agreeableness: r = −0.284, p = 0.025;
Openness to Experience: r = −0.298, p = 0.019), and with the
response times to idiomatic targets, no matter the idiom type
(Agreeableness: r = −0.253, p = 0.047; Openness to Experience:
r = −0.306, p = 0.016, respectively). Openness to Experience
also inversely correlates with the response times to idiomatic
targets of predictable idioms (r = −0.268, p = 0.035). In sum,
the higher were the scores of Agreeableness and Openness to
Experience, the faster were the response times to unpredictable
idioms, and in general to control targets; the higher the scores
of Openness to Experience, the faster the responses to idiomatic
targets of predictable idioms, and lastly the higher the scores
of Extraversion, the faster the responses to control targets of
unpredictable idioms.
Stepwise Regression Analyses
In the hierarchical regression analyses, significant effects
were observed for the response times to idiomatic targets
of predictable idioms. Block 2 (also including WM and
Inhibitory control measures) accounted for 29.1% of the variance
[F(5,61) = 4.603, p = 0.001, R
2
= 0.291] with significant
contributions of the constant term [β = 1537.309 (standard
error = 212.10), t(61) = 7.045, p < 0.001], and of the
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correctly recalled words and intrusions of the Listening Span
[β=−0.246, t(61) =−2.085, p= 0.042; β= 0.313, t(61) = 2.564,
p = 0.012, respectively]. Two further predictors had close-to-
significance values: Openness to Experience and State anxiety
[β = −0.250, t(61) = 1.898, p = 0.063; β = −0.224, t(61) = 1.912,
p = 0.061, respectively]. Block 3 [also including Vocabulary,
constant β = 1830.002, (standard error = 238.37)] accounted
for an additional 6.6% of variance [F(6, 61) = 5.987, p < 0.001,
R2 = 0.357; β = −0.273, t(61) = −2.369, p = 0.021]. The
tolerance values (>7 for all the variables) and the variance
inflation factor values (<1.5 for all the variables) did not suggest
any multicollinearity in the analysis.
Significant effects of a single predictor (Vocabulary) were
found in the response times to control targets of predictable
idioms, where Vocabulary accounted for 10.1% of the variance
[R2 = 0.101; β = 0.332, t(61) = 2.441, p = 0.018], though the
complete model was not significant [F(6,55) = 1.030, p = 0.416],
and to idiomatic targets of unpredictable idioms, where
Vocabulary accounted for 8.1% of the variance [R2 = 0.081;
β = 0.277, t(61) = 2.014, p = 0.049], though again the complete
model was not significant [F(6, 55) = 0.803, p = 0.572]. None of
the Blocks or single predictors produced significant R2 changes
in the response times to the other experimental conditions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In line with prior evidence and with our predictions, when
ambiguous idioms were embedded in idiom-biasing contexts
the idiomatic meaning was equally available for predictable and
unpredictable idioms. Clearly, the joint effects of the contextual
bias and familiarity facilitated semantic processing making the
idiomatic meaning available at the end of the idiom strings
regardless of predictability.
The correlation and regression analyses showed important
contributions of WM, inhibitory control and crystallized verbal
intelligence, as well as marginally significant contributions
of State Anxiety and Openness to Experience. These results
represent an interesting, although still exploratory, addition
to the literature and extend to idioms previous evidence
about the components associated with metaphor and sarcasm
comprehension (Blasko, 1999; Kazmerski et al., 2003; Chiappe
and Chiappe, 2007; Carriedo et al., 2015; Olkoniemi et al., 2016;
Kidd et al., 2018). Specifically, our regression analyses showed
that WM and Inhibitory control (as estimated respectively by
recalled words and intrusion errors of the Listening Span)
accounted for a significant part of variance (29.1%) in the
response times to idiomatic targets of predictable idioms. The
Listening Span task (as other types of WM span tasks) requires
the active maintenance of information in memory in face of
concurrent processing and interference (Conway et al., 2003),
and is considered to provide not only a measure of WM but
also of language processing skills driven by linguistic experience
(Farmer et al., 2017). This is particularly important to idioms
since, as wementioned, processing idiomsmay be more engaging
for the cognitive system than it may appear given the rapidity
with which familiar idioms are generally understood. In fact, it
has been extensively shown that momentary activation of at least
part of the literal meaning of the idiom composing words and
retrieval, after idiom identification, of the idiom meaning from
semantic memory are both necessary to idiom comprehension
(Cacciari et al., 2007; Fanari et al., 2010; Vespignani et al., 2010;
Holsinger and Kaiser, 2013; Canal et al., 2017). How many of
the words composing the idiom string are literally processed
depends on factors such as idiom predictability, familiarity and
contextual information. It has been observed in fact that reading
some of the words composing highly predictable familiar idioms
may suffice to actively pre-activate the word(s) that are more
likely to appear (Molinaro and Carreiras, 2010; Vespignani et al.,
2010). At the same time, when the activated literal meanings
are irrelevant to the idiomatic interpretation, these are actively
suppressed (for a discussion on this point, see Rommers et al.,
2013; Cacciari and Corradini, 2015). Fanari et al. (2010) showed
that when short unpredictable idioms are embedded in idiom-
neutral contexts, their figurative meaning was available only after
the string offset. In this case, the literal meaning of the idiom
composing words was fully activated. But when the same idioms
were embedded in idiom-biasing contexts, idiom recognition was
anticipated and the idiomatic meaning was already available at
the string offset. Regression analyses revealed that the predicting
role of inhibitory control was particularly evident only in the
comprehension of predictable idioms. Admittedly, we do not
have an explanation of the reasons why we did not find similar
effects also on unpredictable idioms. One possibility is that effects
of inhibitory control manifest themselves particularly with faster
response times. Another, not necessarily alternative possibility,
is that individuals scoring higher in WM and inhibitory control
were more likely to possess a more robust knowledge about word
co-occurrence which further speeded up the response times to
predictable idioms. Future studies specifically devoted to test
these possibilities are needed.
Vocabulary scores contributed to the response times to
predictable and unpredictable idioms. The Vocabulary subtest
of WAIS-R provides an estimate of global verbal intelligence
function (Lezak et al., 2004) and of vocabulary size, an important
predictor of language acquisition and processing (Kidd et al.,
2018). Many studies documented an association of vocabulary
knowledge to efficient sentence comprehension (Hunt, 1977).
For instance, Kazmerski et al. (2003) found that vocabulary
knowledge and comprehension abilities correlated and predicted
metaphor interpretation in association to verbal WM. Similarly,
Chiappe and Chiappe (2007) found that vocabulary knowledge
(together with inhibitory control, and print exposure) predicted
the quality of generated metaphors (see also Beaty and Silvia,
2013).We documented the important contribution of crystallized
verbal intelligence also on idiom comprehension. To the
best of our knowledge, few studies on idiom comprehension
reported similar evidence. For instance, in a study testing idiom
comprehension in people with paranoid schizophrenia and
matched controls, Pesciarelli et al. (2014) reported that high
scores in the Vocabulary subtest of WAIS contributed to increase
response accuracy.
Stepwise regression analysis suggests a role also of personality-
related variables. As the marginally significant effect of State
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Anxiety suggests, a temporary state of anxiety, presumably
related to the experimental setting, was associated with faster
response times to idiomatic targets of predictable idioms (the
cognitively easiest experimental condition). Presumably, this
(unpleasant) temporary emotional arousal led participants to
recruit more cognitive resources speeding up idiom processing
(as documented for literal language by Svenson and Maule, 1993;
Breznitz and Berman, 2003). Openness to Experience as well
(although again in a marginally significant way) contributed to
the response times to idiomatic targets of predictable idioms.
Recently, Beaty and Silvia (2013) reported that Openness to
Experience contributed to creative metaphor quality (see also
Goetzman et al., 2007). Several studies have suggested that
Openness to Experience (and also Extraversion, in some studies)
has a positive association with creativity in different domains (for
an overview, see Batey and Furnham, 2006). This is the first time,
to the best of our knowledge, that an association of Openness
to Experience with the comprehension of conventionalized
figurative strings is reported.
Surprisingly enough, we did not observe specific contributions
of Digit Span and Stroop tests, and of verbal fluency and fluid
intelligence tests that were instead reported in prior studies
on figurative language comprehension. However, these effects
were reported for metaphor interpretation and production (e.g.,
Chiappe and Chiappe, 2007; Silvia and Beaty, 2012). Metaphors
and idioms differ in important respects mostly related to
processing workload: first, (familiar) idioms possess a ready-to-
go meaning that has to be retrieved from semantic memory,
and not fully composed as in metaphors. The less demanding
workload on the processing system necessary to compute idioms,
compared to metaphors, together with the specific characteristics
of our idiom experiment, can have made the contribution
of these tests less visible than in metaphor studies. Again,
specific studies testing different forms of figurative language are
required to test this possibility. Even more strikingly, we did
not find any effects of general speed of processing, at variance
with a previous idiom study (Cacciari et al., 2007). However
this may reflect methodological differences between the two
studies.
Finally, one might wonder whether we can derive alternative
predictions on the role of individual differences in idiom
comprehension from Lexical Look-Up models and from Non-
Lexical models. These models were not designed to take
individual differences into account. Notwithstanding, it seems
fair to hypothesize that specific contributions of cognitive and
personality components would be best accommodated by Non-
Lexical Hybrid models of idiom processing since these assume
that idioms are processed just like any other linguistic input, up
to idiom identification after which the idiommeaning is retrieved
from semantic memory, and the activated literal meanings decay.
These models would at least predict a role forWM and inhibitory
control in idiom comprehension since some literal computation
precedes idiom retrieval, and in most cases the literal meanings
of the words activated prior to idiom recognitionmust be actively
suppressed. It is more difficult to detail which of the components
examined in the present study would be associated to idiom
comprehension according to Lexical Look-up models that posit
that idioms are computationally similar to long words. In this
view, in fact idiomatic meanings do not undergo any linguistic
computation being directly retrieved from semantic memory as
for any other words.
CONCLUSIONS
Individual differences in WM capacity, inhibitory control,
crystallized verbal intelligence, State Anxiety, and Openness to
Experience indeed seem to be associated with the contextually-
driven comprehension of an important part of multi-word
expressions, namely idioms. This is the picture emerging from
this exploratory study. Admittedly, the correlational approach of
the study has important limitations. In fact, we cannot a priori
exclude that some or all the significant correlations found in this
study may be due to higher level factors whose specific nature is
not yet clear.
Studies with a higher number of stimuli (and also matched
literal sentences) and participants testing specific hypothesis
about each component of the cognitive and personality
architecture underlying language processing are required before
we can ultimately decide whether the complex architecture
subserving idiom processing totally or partially coincides with
that used to comprehend literal language, and what are the roles
and weights of each component in idiom comprehension. One
might also wonder whether these results are specific to idioms
or they are generalizable to other kinds of literal and non-literal
word strings. Again this is an empirical question that requires
future studies to be properly answered.
Since this study used ambiguous idioms, the disambiguation
of the idiom meaning required the presence and use of
contextual information to decide which of the two meanings
of the string was appropriate. Of course providing idiom-
consistent information has facilitated idiomatic meaning
activation speeding up response times (see Fanari et al.,
2010). Future studies on the role of individual differences in
idiom comprehension may adopt a different approach testing
unambiguous idioms, presented in and out of context, with
different behavioral paradigms (e.g., eye-tracking, sentence, or
word-by-word reading times) that may provide a more detailed
picture than the cross-modal lexical decision task that taps on
whether or not the idiomatic meaning is available at the string
offset.
Why it is important to study the role of individual differences
in language acquisition and processing not relegating them to
error variance (Kidd et al., 2018)? First, because the presence
of individual differences obscured by group data may be one
of the causes of inconsistent findings in the cognitive science
literature (Hannon and Daneman, 2001) and of unresolved
theoretical controversies in psycholinguistics (Kidd et al., 2018).
Second, studying the role of individual variability may shed
further light on the neural and cognitive architecture underlying
language (and in general any mental processes) and on how
it interacts with language experience. A related question is
why idioms are relevant to these aims. The response is that
they indeed are relevant not simply because they are pervasive
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in everyday communication, but rather because the study of
individual differences in idiom comprehension can provide a
better understating of the role of distributional information
in language processing. Interestingly, the relevance of the
notion of predictability in contemporary models of language
processing (for an overview, see Kutas and Federmeier, 2000)
has led to an increasing interest in the mechanisms underlying
idiom comprehension (Vespignani et al., 2010; Cacciari, 2014).
Idiomatic expressions, together with other types of multi-word
literal and non-literal expressions, represent an interesting test
case of how the brain and the mind handle the frequency with
which we are exposed to linguistic input in the environment
(statistical learning). In fact, the brain is sensitive to distributional
information in the input as reflected, for language, by the
frequency of co-occurrence of words in compositional (e.g.,
black and white) and non-compositional multi-word strings (e.g.,
kick the bucket) (e.g., Arnon and Snider, 2010; Molinaro and
Carreiras, 2010; Tremblay and Baayen, 2010; Vespignani et al.,
2010; Tremblay et al., 2011; Siyanova-Chanturia, 2013; Cacciari
and Corradini, 2015).
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APPENDIX
PREDICTABLE IDIOMS
1. Ficcare il naso
La cameriera ha visto l’agenda aperta sul tavolo e ci ha ficcato il
naso.
CURIOSITA’ / DIFFICOLTA’
2. Aprire gli occhi
Anna si era innamorata dell’uomo sbagliato, ma ora finalmente
ha aperto gli occhi.
CONSAPEVOLEZZA / QUALIFICAZIONE
3. Prendere al volo
Il cliente ha ascoltato l’offerta del venditore e ha deciso di
prenderla al volo.
OCCASIONE / DESTINO
4. Pugnalare alle spalle
Il rapinatore disse alla polizia il nome del complice e così lo
pugnalò alle spalle.
TRADIMENTO / RENDIMENTO
5. Rimanere sullo stomaco
A Giorgio la decisione di sospendere gli aumenti di stipendio è
rimasta sullo stomaco.
RABBIA / STAMPA
6. Sporcarsi le mani
Quando il noto deputato ha accettato la grossa tangente si è
davvero sporcato le mani.
DISONESTA’ / ANDAMENTO
7. Strapparsi i capelli
Quando Luisa si è accorta che aveva perso l’antico anello si è
strappata i capelli.
DISPERAZIONE / RELAZIONE
8. Stringere i denti
Per arrivare alla fine della lunga maratona il podista ha dovuto
stringere i denti.
SFORZO / ROVESCIO
9. Tapparsi le orecchie
Il medico diceva sempre a Luca di smettere di fumare ma lui si
tappava le orecchie.
RIFIUTO / RISATA
10. Rimboccarsi le maniche
Per terminare in tempo la relazione per il direttore, l’impiegata si
è rimboccata le maniche.
IMPEGNO / PASSAGGIO
11. Sfuggire di mano
Il poliziotto doveva mantenere l’ordine nel corteo, ma la
situazione gli è sfuggita di mano.
CONTROLLO / INDIRIZZO
12. Vuotare il sacco
Dopo avere a lungo negato le accuse, alla fine il ragazzo ha vuotato
il sacco.
CONFESSIONE / SEZIONE
13. Brancolare nel buio
La polizia stava indagando sull’omicidio da mesi, ma continuava
a brancolare nel buio.
INCERTEZZA/ COLAZIONE
14. Voltare le spalle
Il padre sapeva che il figlio era in crisi, ma ugualmente gli ha
voltato le spalle.
INDIFFERENZA / RICOVERO
UNPREDICTABLE IDIOMS
15. Giocare in casa
Lucia ha fatto il concorso nella sua Università perché sapeva di
giocare in casa.
VANTAGGIO / SVOLTA
16. Perdere il filo
Sara stava raccontano una favola alla nipotina ma si accorse di
aver perso il filo.
DISTRAZIONE / NAZIONE
17. Rompere il ghiaccio
Fabio voleva uscire con la nuova studentessa francese e ha cercato
di rompere il ghiaccio.
IMBARAZZO / REGIME
18. Scendere in campo
Dopo i gravi episodi di razzismo molte associazioni per i diritti
umani sono scese in campo.
AZIONE / COPPIA
19. Tagliare la corda
Il rapinatore non fece in tempo a scassinare la cassaforte e dovette
tagliare la corda.
FUGA / LEZIONE
20. Prendere di petto
Matteo aveva un serio problema di salute e senza aspettare l’ha
preso di petto.
DECISIONE / RUMORE
21. Dare una strigliata
Pietro è stato di nuovo bocciato all’esame di inglese e sua madre
gli ha dato una strigliata.
RIMPROVERO / RISERVATEZZA
22. Essere a cavallo
Quando la studentessa di ingegneria elettronica terminò tutti gli
esami capì di essere a cavallo. RIUSCITA / GIOVINEZZA
23. Toccare il fondo
Andrea ha perso tutti i soldi al gioco d’azzardo ed ora ha
veramente toccato il fondo.
ROVINA / RIFUGIO
24. Alzare il gomito
Ieri sera gli amici sono andati in osteria e qualcuno di loro ha
alzato il gomito.
UBRIACHEZZA / INTROSPEZIONE
25.Mettersi in mezzo
Dato che i parenti stavano litigando per la divisione dell’eredità
Carla si è messa in mezzo.
INTROMISSIONE / INEFFICIENZA
26. Fare i conti
La mamma era molto arrabbiata col figlio e gli ha detto che quella
sera avrebbero fatto i conti. SGRIDATA / PREPARAZIONE
27. Togliersi dai piedi
Mara non sopportava più la suocera troppo invadente e voleva
assolutamente togliersela dai piedi.
FASTIDIO / CONTEGNO
28. Chiudere un occhio
La maestra si era accorta che Giulio aveva copiato dal compagno,
ma ha chiuso un occhio.
TOLLERANZA / RILASCIO
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 17 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 659
